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The literature on the effects of foreign direct investment (FDI) and activities of multinational enterprises
(MNEs) on host-countries has been almost exclusively focused on issues of productivity, growth and
wages.   We argue that this leaves quite a bit of important unexplored areas of inquiry, particularly
those connected with the interactions of local communities and governments with MNEs.  As an example,
we provide a novel analysis of local corporate philanthropy, which shows significant differences between
local- and foreign-owned corporations. We find that foreign-owned enterprises are less likely to give,
but that when they do give, it is substantially more in magnitude than domestic firms, everything else
equal.  This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that foreign-owned firms would prefer to use
corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities on a more international scale, but will strategically
use CSR activities for public relation motives when the MNE faces greater local scrutiny and/or bias.
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 ﾠ 1	 ﾠ
1.	 ﾠIntroduction	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠof	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠ(FDI)	 ﾠon	 ﾠhost	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠtopic	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
much	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠto	 ﾠboth	 ﾠthe	 ﾠacademic	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolicymakers.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFDI	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠ
growing	 ﾠfaster	 ﾠthan	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast	 ﾠcouple	 ﾠdecades,	 ﾠand	 ﾠmultinational	 ﾠ
enterprises	 ﾠ(MNEs)	 ﾠare	 ﾠoften	 ﾠseen	 ﾠas	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠdrivers	 ﾠof	 ﾠinnovation	 ﾠand	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠonly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld	 ﾠeconomy,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocations	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠMNE	 ﾠaffiliates	 ﾠ
reside.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIndeed,	 ﾠlocations	 ﾠoften	 ﾠcompete	 ﾠfor	 ﾠFDI	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠlowered	 ﾠtax	 ﾠrates	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
incentives.1	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpaper,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠan	 ﾠoverview	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠtopics	 ﾠcovered	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
prior	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠof	 ﾠFDI	 ﾠon	 ﾠhost	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhave	 ﾠprimarily	 ﾠ
examined	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠon	 ﾠhost-ﾭ‐country	 ﾠproductivity,	 ﾠgrowth,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwages.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠthen	 ﾠ
discuss	 ﾠhow	 ﾠmany	 ﾠtopics	 ﾠconnected	 ﾠwith	 ﾠFDI	 ﾠand	 ﾠhost	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠleft	 ﾠ
unexplored	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpoint,	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠones	 ﾠthat	 ﾠexamine	 ﾠhow	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠand	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠ
communities	 ﾠinteract,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthese	 ﾠinteractions	 ﾠmay	 ﾠvary	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthose	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ
domestic	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠand	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠcommunities.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠmay	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
different	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠgoals	 ﾠthan	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfirms,	 ﾠleading	 ﾠto	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠin	 ﾠbehavior.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Relatedly,	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠby	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpolarizing	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠcommunity,	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠmay	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠoptimal	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠby	 ﾠboth	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMNE	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠgovernment.2	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠanother	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠmay	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠacross	 ﾠmany	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠ
dimensions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFirms	 ﾠmay	 ﾠface	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠchallenges	 ﾠfinding	 ﾠsuitable	 ﾠworkers	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
1	 ﾠOman	 ﾠ(1999)	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠincentives	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠMNEs	 ﾠacross	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠ
countries,	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠfor	 ﾠindustries	 ﾠlocating	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠplants,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠautomobile	 ﾠsector.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWilson	 ﾠ
(1999)	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠan	 ﾠoverview	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠon	 ﾠtax	 ﾠcompetition	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinvestment,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠthis	 ﾠtopic	 ﾠin	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠyears	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠquite	 ﾠstrong.	 ﾠ
2	 ﾠFor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhigh-ﾭ‐profile	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠinvestments	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates	 ﾠhad	 ﾠ
significant	 ﾠimpacts	 ﾠon	 ﾠstate-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠgubernatorial	 ﾠelections.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 2	 ﾠ
because	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠand,	 ﾠrelatedly,	 ﾠrequest	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠworker	 ﾠtraining	 ﾠ
incentives	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠgovernments.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThey	 ﾠmay	 ﾠalso	 ﾠdiffer	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠthey	 ﾠorganize	 ﾠ
production	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠand	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠrequest	 ﾠ
different	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠinfrastructure	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ As	 ﾠan	 ﾠillustration,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠan	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠof	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠphilanthropy	 ﾠ
using	 ﾠdata	 ﾠon	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠgifts	 ﾠto	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠchapters	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠWay	 ﾠ(UW)	 ﾠorganization,	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠpredominant	 ﾠcharity	 ﾠorganization	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠchapters	 ﾠ
coordinate	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠto	 ﾠother	 ﾠcharities	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcommunities.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOur	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠfinds	 ﾠ
statistically	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠthat	 ﾠforeign-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠdiffer	 ﾠsubstantially	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
domestic-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠphilanthropy.	 ﾠ	 ﾠForeign-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠless	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠgive,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠgive	 ﾠproportionately	 ﾠmore	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdo	 ﾠgive	 ﾠto	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠ
charities.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠfor	 ﾠforeign-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhave	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠplants.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠpattern	 ﾠis	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠare	 ﾠless	 ﾠ
interested	 ﾠin	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠto	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠcharities,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠprofile	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
community	 ﾠand	 ﾠmust	 ﾠovercome	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠpolarization.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
2.	 ﾠA	 ﾠbrief	 ﾠreview	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠof	 ﾠFDI	 ﾠon	 ﾠhost	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠearliest	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠof	 ﾠFDI	 ﾠon	 ﾠhost	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠ
primarily	 ﾠconsists	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠmacroeconomic	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠon	 ﾠhow	 ﾠFDI	 ﾠaffects	 ﾠGDP	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠhosting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFDI.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠnaturally	 ﾠbrought	 ﾠabout	 ﾠboth	 ﾠ
theoretical	 ﾠand	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠmicroeconomic	 ﾠfoundations	 ﾠof	 ﾠhow	 ﾠ
FDI	 ﾠcould	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠcountry-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠgrowth.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠtheoretical	 ﾠside	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠmodels	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
how	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠbring	 ﾠtechnology	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcould	 ﾠultimately	 ﾠspill	 ﾠover	 ﾠand	 ﾠdiffuse	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 3	 ﾠ
through	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhost	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠ(e.g.,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠFindlay,	 ﾠ1978).	 ﾠ	 ﾠAs	 ﾠricher	 ﾠdata,	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠplant-ﾭ‐
level	 ﾠdata,	 ﾠbecame	 ﾠavailable,	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠanalyses	 ﾠof	 ﾠproductivity	 ﾠspillovers	 ﾠbecame	 ﾠ
feasible,	 ﾠleading	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠvirtual	 ﾠcottage	 ﾠindustry	 ﾠanalyzing	 ﾠthis	 ﾠtopic	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast	 ﾠ
couple	 ﾠdecades.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAvailability	 ﾠof	 ﾠplant-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠdata	 ﾠalso	 ﾠallowed	 ﾠresearchers	 ﾠto	 ﾠexamine	 ﾠ
differences	 ﾠin	 ﾠwages	 ﾠacross	 ﾠforeign-ﾭ‐	 ﾠand	 ﾠdomestic-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠfirms,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠever	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
sophisticated	 ﾠwork	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠif	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠpay	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠwages	 ﾠeven	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠ
controlling	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠand	 ﾠworker	 ﾠcharacteristics.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠhurdle	 ﾠinherent	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠall	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtopics	 ﾠis	 ﾠendogeneity	 ﾠ–	 ﾠare	 ﾠforeign-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠaffecting	 ﾠhost-ﾭ‐
countries	 ﾠin	 ﾠthese	 ﾠdimensions	 ﾠor	 ﾠare	 ﾠthey	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠdrawn	 ﾠto	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
attributes?	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Lipsey	 ﾠ(2004)	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠan	 ﾠexcellent	 ﾠreview	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠof	 ﾠFDI	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
economic	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠof	 ﾠMNEs	 ﾠon	 ﾠhost	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠfollows,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwill	 ﾠcharacterize	 ﾠ
his	 ﾠsummary	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtime	 ﾠhe	 ﾠwrote,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhighlight	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠ
developments	 ﾠsince	 ﾠ2004.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
2.1.	 ﾠFDI	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠon	 ﾠhost-ﾭ‐country	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Initial	 ﾠwork	 ﾠto	 ﾠestimate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠof	 ﾠFDI	 ﾠand	 ﾠhost-ﾭ‐country	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠusing	 ﾠ
country-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠdata	 ﾠfound	 ﾠmixed	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠat	 ﾠbest	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠrelationship.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
However,	 ﾠmore	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠhas	 ﾠfound	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠof	 ﾠFDI	 ﾠon	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
particular	 ﾠcircumstances,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠenough	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
development	 ﾠ(Borensztein,	 ﾠet	 ﾠal,	 ﾠ1998)	 ﾠor	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐developed	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
institutions	 ﾠ(Durham,	 ﾠ2004,	 ﾠand	 ﾠAlfaro	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2004).	 ﾠ	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠhas	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠ
recent	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠby	 ﾠCarkovic	 ﾠand	 ﾠLevine	 ﾠ(2005),	 ﾠChowdhury	 ﾠand	 ﾠMavrotas	 ﾠ(2006),	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 4	 ﾠ
Hansen	 ﾠand	 ﾠRand	 ﾠ(2006),	 ﾠand	 ﾠHerzer	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ(2008)	 ﾠthat	 ﾠuse	 ﾠadvanced	 ﾠeconometric	 ﾠ
techniques	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠfor	 ﾠendogeneity	 ﾠand	 ﾠfind	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠrobust	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠfor	 ﾠFDI	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠgrowth,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthese	 ﾠmore	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠcircumstances.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠgeneral,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
literature	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠrun	 ﾠout	 ﾠof	 ﾠsteam,	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthe	 ﾠendogeneity	 ﾠissues	 ﾠ
make	 ﾠit	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠto	 ﾠdraw	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠconclusions.	 ﾠ
 
2.2.	 ﾠFDI	 ﾠproductivity	 ﾠspillovers	 ﾠin	 ﾠhost-ﾭ‐countries	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠinconclusiveness	 ﾠof	 ﾠFDI-ﾭ‐growth	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠmain	 ﾠreason	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠ
literature	 ﾠhas	 ﾠturned	 ﾠits	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠto	 ﾠproductivity	 ﾠof	 ﾠforeign-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
possibility	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠproductivity	 ﾠspills	 ﾠover	 ﾠto	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhost-ﾭ‐country.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Oftentimes,	 ﾠturning	 ﾠto	 ﾠmicro-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠdata	 ﾠcan	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠalleviate	 ﾠor	 ﾠeliminate	 ﾠendogenity	 ﾠ
concerns	 ﾠthat	 ﾠexist	 ﾠwith	 ﾠmacro-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠdata.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠas	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcase.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠfinding	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠcorrelation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠhost	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠproductivity	 ﾠof	 ﾠdomestically-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠcan	 ﾠstill	 ﾠsuffer	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠendogeneity	 ﾠbias	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠis	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠto	 ﾠeliminate	 ﾠ–	 ﾠnamely	 ﾠthe	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠmay	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠattracted	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠof	 ﾠsome	 ﾠthird	 ﾠfactor	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠdriving	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠproductivity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠall	 ﾠ
firms	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcountry.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
One	 ﾠclear	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠverified	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
generally	 ﾠmore	 ﾠproductive	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfirm.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠone	 ﾠ
controls	 ﾠfor	 ﾠother	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠcharacteristics,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠlonger	 ﾠas	 ﾠclear	 ﾠthat	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
different	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfirms.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠfact,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠattributes	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠMNEs	 ﾠin	 ﾠgeneral,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠownership	 ﾠnationality,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠleads	 ﾠthem	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
productive	 ﾠthan	 ﾠother	 ﾠfirms.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠanother	 ﾠissue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠalways	 ﾠfully	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 5	 ﾠ
considered	 ﾠby	 ﾠprevious	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠ–	 ﾠidentifying	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠMNEs	 ﾠhave	 ﾠdiffering	 ﾠ
impacts	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhost-ﾭ‐country	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠ(i.e.,	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
country-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠattributes)	 ﾠor	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠfirm-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠattributes	 ﾠthat	 ﾠled	 ﾠthem	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠan	 ﾠMNE	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠplace.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠobviously	 ﾠmatters	 ﾠa	 ﾠlot	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpolicy.	 ﾠ	 ﾠShould	 ﾠa	 ﾠhost	 ﾠ
country	 ﾠbe	 ﾠencouraging	 ﾠforeign-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠcompanies	 ﾠto	 ﾠlocate	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠeconomy,	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
simply	 ﾠencouraging	 ﾠMNE	 ﾠpresence,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠdomestic-ﾭ‐based	 ﾠMNEs?	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ While	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠclear	 ﾠproductivity	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠwith	 ﾠMNEs,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
positive	 ﾠspillovers	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠforeign-ﾭ‐firms	 ﾠto	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠvery	 ﾠmixed,	 ﾠ
despite	 ﾠliterally	 ﾠhundreds	 ﾠof	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtopic.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠtermed	 ﾠhorizontal	 ﾠspillovers	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthose	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠindustry.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠ
meta	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠby	 ﾠGörg	 ﾠand	 ﾠGreenaway	 ﾠ(2004,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ23)	 ﾠconcludes	 ﾠ“only	 ﾠlimited	 ﾠ
evidence	 ﾠin	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠof	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠspillovers	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠreported.	 ﾠMost	 ﾠwork	 ﾠfails	 ﾠto	 ﾠfind	 ﾠ
positive	 ﾠspillovers,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsome	 ﾠeven	 ﾠreporting	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠspillovers,	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠ
level.”	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ A	 ﾠresuscitation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠcame	 ﾠwith	 ﾠJavorcik	 ﾠ(2004),	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠfinds	 ﾠ
strong	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠvertical	 ﾠbackward	 ﾠlinkage	 ﾠspillover	 ﾠeffect;	 ﾠi.e.,	 ﾠa	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠ
impact	 ﾠof	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠon	 ﾠdomestic-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠupstream	 ﾠsuppliers	 ﾠto	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠhost	 ﾠcountry.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThere	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠmany	 ﾠfollow-ﾭ‐up	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠestimating	 ﾠboth	 ﾠvertical	 ﾠ
backward	 ﾠand	 ﾠforward	 ﾠlinkage	 ﾠspillovers	 ﾠusing	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠand	 ﾠsettings.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Havranek	 ﾠand	 ﾠIrsova	 ﾠ(2010)	 ﾠperforms	 ﾠa	 ﾠmeta	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠmany	 ﾠestimates	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠand	 ﾠconcludes	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠvertical	 ﾠ
backward	 ﾠlinkage	 ﾠspillover,	 ﾠa	 ﾠstatistically	 ﾠsignificant,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠtrivial,	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠvertical	 ﾠ
forward	 ﾠlinkage,	 ﾠand	 ﾠno	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠfor	 ﾠhorizontal	 ﾠspillovers.	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 ﾠ This	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠreaching	 ﾠserious	 ﾠdiminishing	 ﾠmarginal	 ﾠreturns	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
well,	 ﾠthough	 ﾠthere	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠsome	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠwork	 ﾠthat	 ﾠlooks	 ﾠat	 ﾠnew	 ﾠavenues	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
understand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmicro-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠfoundations	 ﾠfor	 ﾠspillovers	 ﾠvia	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirms.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠ
example,	 ﾠBranstetter	 ﾠ(2006)	 ﾠuses	 ﾠpatent	 ﾠdata	 ﾠto	 ﾠexamine	 ﾠthe	 ﾠflows	 ﾠof	 ﾠknowledge	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠJapanese-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
2.3.	 ﾠFDI	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠon	 ﾠwages	 ﾠin	 ﾠhost	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠ
Initial	 ﾠwork	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠarea	 ﾠwas	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠand	 ﾠestablished	 ﾠthat	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠpay	 ﾠ
substantially	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠwages	 ﾠthan	 ﾠdomestic-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠ(see,	 ﾠe.g.,	 ﾠAitken	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.,	 ﾠ1996).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
These	 ﾠ“foreign	 ﾠpremiums”	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwages	 ﾠfall	 ﾠsome,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠare	 ﾠstill	 ﾠsubstantial,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠ
controlling	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠcharacteristics.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠcontrasts	 ﾠwith	 ﾠproductivity	 ﾠspillover	 ﾠ
differences	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠinsignificant	 ﾠonce	 ﾠone	 ﾠcontrols	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠcharacteristics,	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
discussed	 ﾠabove.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMore	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠwork	 ﾠhas	 ﾠexamined	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnext	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
wage	 ﾠpremium	 ﾠexists,	 ﾠcontrolling	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠworker	 ﾠattributes	 ﾠ–	 ﾠor	 ﾠeven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠ
worker.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOECD	 ﾠ(2008)	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠreview	 ﾠof	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠarea.	 ﾠ
An	 ﾠinteresting	 ﾠinnovation	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠmatched	 ﾠfirm-ﾭ‐employee	 ﾠdata	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
examine	 ﾠwage	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠfor	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠafter	 ﾠa	 ﾠdomestic-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠis	 ﾠacquired	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
foreign-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠfirm,	 ﾠor	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠa	 ﾠworker	 ﾠswitches	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠa	 ﾠdomestic-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
foreign-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠ(see,	 ﾠe.g.,	 ﾠHeyman,	 ﾠSjöholm,	 ﾠand	 ﾠTingvall,	 ﾠ2007).	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠnot	 ﾠideal	 ﾠ
natural	 ﾠexperiments,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠget	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠcloser	 ﾠthan	 ﾠprevious	 ﾠones	 ﾠto	 ﾠtruly	 ﾠ
identifying	 ﾠa	 ﾠtreatment	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠof	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠownership	 ﾠon	 ﾠwages.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠwage	 ﾠpremium	 ﾠ
found	 ﾠin	 ﾠthese	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠis	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠsmaller	 ﾠand	 ﾠoften	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠreject	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠzero.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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3.	 ﾠNew	 ﾠdirections	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexamining	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠof	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠon	 ﾠhost	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠ
While	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠlearned	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexamination	 ﾠof	 ﾠFDI	 ﾠand	 ﾠMNEs	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
growth,	 ﾠproductivity,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwages	 ﾠin	 ﾠhost	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠsurprising	 ﾠhow	 ﾠdeeply	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
literature	 ﾠhas	 ﾠinvestigated	 ﾠthese	 ﾠissues	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠbranching	 ﾠout	 ﾠinto	 ﾠother	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠ
ways	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠFDI	 ﾠand	 ﾠMNEs	 ﾠcan	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠhost	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFrom	 ﾠour	 ﾠperspective,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠquite	 ﾠa	 ﾠfew	 ﾠnew	 ﾠdirections	 ﾠto	 ﾠexplore,	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠhow	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠ
firms	 ﾠinteract	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthey	 ﾠlocate.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
There	 ﾠare	 ﾠsome	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠtensions	 ﾠthat	 ﾠunderlie	 ﾠthis	 ﾠtopic.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
foreign-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠhave	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠwith	 ﾠnew	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠcommunities.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠ
may	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠhow	 ﾠa	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠchooses	 ﾠlocations,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠeven	 ﾠhow	 ﾠit	 ﾠoperates	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthat	 ﾠlocation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠRelatedly,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirm,	 ﾠand	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠits	 ﾠ(foreign)	 ﾠmanagers	 ﾠ
may	 ﾠnot	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwelfare	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠemployees	 ﾠand	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠdecision-ﾭ‐
making	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠdomestic-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠwould.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAt	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠ
communities	 ﾠmay	 ﾠview	 ﾠforeign-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠdifferently	 ﾠthan	 ﾠdomestic-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠfirms.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
These	 ﾠinherent	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠbiases)	 ﾠmay	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠalter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
important	 ﾠinteractions	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtake	 ﾠplace	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠand	 ﾠforeign-ﾭ‐
owned	 ﾠfirms,	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbidding	 ﾠand	 ﾠconcessions	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠmake	 ﾠto	 ﾠattract	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠretain	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoutcomes	 ﾠof	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠelections.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠnext	 ﾠ
enumerate	 ﾠa	 ﾠfew	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠtopics	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠarea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠunexplored,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
potentially	 ﾠquite	 ﾠimportant.	 ﾠ
Local	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠoften	 ﾠbid	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠincentive	 ﾠpackages	 ﾠto	 ﾠattract	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠindustrial	 ﾠestablishments.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠeasy	 ﾠto	 ﾠfind	 ﾠmedia	 ﾠaccounts	 ﾠ
detailing	 ﾠincentives	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠto	 ﾠnew	 ﾠautomobile	 ﾠor	 ﾠsemiconductor	 ﾠmanufacturing	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 8	 ﾠ
plants.	 ﾠ	 ﾠForeign-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠmay	 ﾠsystematically	 ﾠdiffer	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠdomestic-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠof	 ﾠincentives	 ﾠthey	 ﾠrequest	 ﾠand	 ﾠhow	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠendowments	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠlocation	 ﾠdecision.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubstantial	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠ
examining	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbidding	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinvestment,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠissues	 ﾠhave	 ﾠrarely	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠseriously	 ﾠ
considered	 ﾠto	 ﾠour	 ﾠknowledge.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOne	 ﾠexception	 ﾠis	 ﾠFiglio	 ﾠand	 ﾠBlonigen	 ﾠ(2000),	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠonly	 ﾠexamines	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifferential	 ﾠimpacts	 ﾠon	 ﾠwages	 ﾠby	 ﾠforeign-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠfirms,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
also	 ﾠon	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠexpenditures.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠUsing	 ﾠdata	 ﾠon	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠand	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠ
investment	 ﾠinto	 ﾠSouth	 ﾠCarolina	 ﾠcounties,	 ﾠFiglio	 ﾠand	 ﾠBlonigen	 ﾠfind	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠunlike	 ﾠ
domestic	 ﾠinvestment,	 ﾠnew	 ﾠforeign-ﾭ‐firm	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠis	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠlower	 ﾠcounty-ﾭ‐
level	 ﾠper-ﾭ‐pupil	 ﾠexpenditures	 ﾠon	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠeducation,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠexpenditures	 ﾠon	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
safety	 ﾠand	 ﾠtransportation	 ﾠinfrastructure.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnother	 ﾠexception	 ﾠis	 ﾠGemmell,	 ﾠKneller,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠSanz	 ﾠ(2008),	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠlooks	 ﾠat	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsize	 ﾠand	 ﾠcomposition	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
expenditures	 ﾠin	 ﾠOECD	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠrespond	 ﾠto	 ﾠglobalization	 ﾠforces,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠinbound	 ﾠ
FDI.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThey	 ﾠfind	 ﾠthat	 ﾠFDI	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcorrelate	 ﾠwith	 ﾠany	 ﾠchange	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsector,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠspending.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠissue	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠList,	 ﾠMcHone,	 ﾠand	 ﾠMillimet	 ﾠ(2004),	 ﾠwho	 ﾠfind	 ﾠthat	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠaffected	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠlocation	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates	 ﾠby	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠenvironmental	 ﾠregulations,	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfirms.	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠarea	 ﾠwe	 ﾠfeel	 ﾠhas	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
interaction	 ﾠof	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠand	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠeconomy.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠ
anecdotal	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠthat	 ﾠFDI	 ﾠcan	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsize	 ﾠof	 ﾠincentives	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
foreign-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠautomobile	 ﾠmanufacturers	 ﾠhad	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠon	 ﾠU.S.	 ﾠ
gubernatorial	 ﾠelections	 ﾠin	 ﾠAlabama,	 ﾠIndiana,	 ﾠand	 ﾠKentucky	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠearly	 ﾠ1990s.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 9	 ﾠ
(Chappell,	 ﾠ1994)	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠquite	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠramifications	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠoccurred	 ﾠhad	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠin	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠby	 ﾠdomestic-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠfirms,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠhas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠsystematically	 ﾠinvestigated.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠmay	 ﾠalso	 ﾠactively	 ﾠ
pursue	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠin	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAn	 ﾠ
example	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠof	 ﾠquid	 ﾠpro	 ﾠquo	 ﾠFDI,	 ﾠhypothesized	 ﾠby	 ﾠBhagwati,	 ﾠ
Dinopoulos	 ﾠand	 ﾠWong	 ﾠ(1992),	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠinvest	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠto	 ﾠlower	 ﾠ
import	 ﾠbarriers	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthreat	 ﾠof	 ﾠimport	 ﾠbarriers.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBlonigen	 ﾠand	 ﾠFeenstra	 ﾠ(1997)	 ﾠfind	 ﾠ
some	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠhypothesis	 ﾠusing	 ﾠU.S.	 ﾠdata	 ﾠon	 ﾠFDI	 ﾠand	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠprotection,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠ
Blonigen	 ﾠand	 ﾠFiglio	 ﾠ(1998)	 ﾠfind	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠnuanced	 ﾠresult	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠexamining	 ﾠFDI	 ﾠinto	 ﾠ
regions	 ﾠand	 ﾠvotes	 ﾠby	 ﾠnational	 ﾠlegislative	 ﾠrepresentatives	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthose	 ﾠregions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFDI	 ﾠ
appears	 ﾠto	 ﾠstrengthen	 ﾠpoliticians’	 ﾠprior	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠstances,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠFDI	 ﾠ
associated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠfree-ﾭ‐traders	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠvote	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfree	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
protectionists	 ﾠbecoming	 ﾠmore	 ﾠprotectionist	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠstance.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
Grether	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ(2001),	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠfinds	 ﾠthat	 ﾠFDI-ﾭ‐intensive	 ﾠsectors	 ﾠin	 ﾠMexico	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
greater	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠprotection,	 ﾠceteris	 ﾠparibus.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
There	 ﾠare	 ﾠvery	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠmany	 ﾠother	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠand	 ﾠnational	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠ
may	 ﾠsystematically	 ﾠtry	 ﾠto	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠonce	 ﾠlocated	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhost	 ﾠcountry,	 ﾠyet	 ﾠthere	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
been	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠdone	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠarea.	 ﾠ	 ﾠLikewise	 ﾠthere	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠto	 ﾠexamine	 ﾠhow	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠ
politics	 ﾠmay	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠincentive	 ﾠpackages	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠto	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirms.	 ﾠ	 ﾠJaneba	 ﾠ(2004)	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Branstetter	 ﾠand	 ﾠFeenstra	 ﾠ(2002)	 ﾠare	 ﾠnotable	 ﾠexceptions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠJaneba	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠa	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠ
where	 ﾠvoters	 ﾠbalance	 ﾠoff	 ﾠFDI	 ﾠincentives	 ﾠwith	 ﾠredistributive	 ﾠpolicies,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠ
Branstetter	 ﾠand	 ﾠFeenstra	 ﾠexamine	 ﾠand	 ﾠestimate	 ﾠhow	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠthe	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 10	 ﾠ
balances	 ﾠoff	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgains	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠand	 ﾠFDI	 ﾠwith	 ﾠits	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠfavoring	 ﾠstate-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠ
enterprises.	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠtopic	 ﾠarea	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠand	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠdimensions	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠinteractions	 ﾠwith	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠcommunities.	 ﾠ	 ﾠDo	 ﾠthese	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠoperate	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠan	 ﾠisolated	 ﾠmanner	 ﾠor	 ﾠdo	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠon	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
international	 ﾠawareness	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthey	 ﾠoperate?	 ﾠ	 ﾠLikewise,	 ﾠhow	 ﾠ
much	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠadaptation	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠculture	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirm’s	 ﾠown	 ﾠ
corporate	 ﾠculture?	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Again,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠare	 ﾠsuggestions	 ﾠof	 ﾠtopics	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠthink	 ﾠare	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠquite	 ﾠ
important,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠhave	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠexplored.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmeant	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠexhaustive	 ﾠlist	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
we	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠhave	 ﾠnot	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠmany	 ﾠdetails.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAs	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠnext	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
specific	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠdetailed)	 ﾠexample	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠtype	 ﾠof	 ﾠinteraction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
local	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠ–	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠphilanthropy	 ﾠdecisions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠexample	 ﾠshows	 ﾠ
how	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠinteractions	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠnecessarily	 ﾠstraightforward	 ﾠto	 ﾠanalyze	 ﾠand	 ﾠyet	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
clearly	 ﾠhave	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠimplications.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
4.	 ﾠAn	 ﾠexample:	 ﾠDifferences	 ﾠin	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠownership	 ﾠnationality	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsection,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠdata	 ﾠcollected	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠcharitable	 ﾠorganizations	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ
United	 ﾠWay	 ﾠchapters	 ﾠ–	 ﾠto	 ﾠexamine	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠforeign-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠdiffer	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
domestic-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhether,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhow	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠto	 ﾠgive	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
charities	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠcommunity.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠa	 ﾠbrief	 ﾠoverview	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠ(CSR),	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠincludes	 ﾠcharitable	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠby	 ﾠfirms.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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We	 ﾠthen	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠsome	 ﾠhypotheses	 ﾠabout	 ﾠhow	 ﾠforeign-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠmay	 ﾠdiffer	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
charitable	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠto	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠcharities	 ﾠand	 ﾠexamine	 ﾠthese	 ﾠhypotheses	 ﾠempirically.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
4.1.	 ﾠCorporate	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠ
There	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠgrowing	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠon	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠmotivations	 ﾠfor	 ﾠengaging	 ﾠin	 ﾠCSR	 ﾠ
activities,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠcharitable	 ﾠdonations.3	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠOne	 ﾠschool	 ﾠof	 ﾠthought	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
inefficient	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠto	 ﾠengage	 ﾠin	 ﾠCSR.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSince	 ﾠall	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠ(workers	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
owners)	 ﾠare	 ﾠfree	 ﾠto	 ﾠpersonally	 ﾠdonate	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠincome	 ﾠthey	 ﾠgain	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirm,	 ﾠ
some	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠthe	 ﾠenterprise	 ﾠitself	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinvolved	 ﾠin	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirms’	 ﾠ
profits.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIndeed,	 ﾠFriedman	 ﾠ(1970)	 ﾠargues	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠare	 ﾠorganized	 ﾠto	 ﾠmaximize	 ﾠ
profits	 ﾠfor	 ﾠits	 ﾠshareholders	 ﾠand,	 ﾠthus,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠrole	 ﾠfor	 ﾠCSR.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFirm	 ﾠresources	 ﾠspent	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠmake	 ﾠCSR	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠused	 ﾠto	 ﾠmaximize	 ﾠprofits,	 ﾠproviding	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠ
income	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworkers	 ﾠand	 ﾠowners	 ﾠto	 ﾠdonate,	 ﾠshould	 ﾠthey	 ﾠso	 ﾠchoose.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAs	 ﾠFriedman	 ﾠ
concludes,	 ﾠ“there	 ﾠis	 ﾠone	 ﾠand	 ﾠonly	 ﾠone	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠbusiness—to	 ﾠuse	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
resources	 ﾠand	 ﾠengage	 ﾠin	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠdesigned	 ﾠto	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠits	 ﾠprofits	 ﾠso	 ﾠlong	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠstays	 ﾠ
within	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrules	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgame,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay,	 ﾠengages	 ﾠin	 ﾠopen	 ﾠand	 ﾠfree	 ﾠcompetition	 ﾠ
without	 ﾠdeception	 ﾠor	 ﾠfraud”.	 ﾠ
An	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠview	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠCSR	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrategy	 ﾠused	 ﾠby	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠto	 ﾠmaximize	 ﾠ
profits.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠconsumers’	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠfirm’s	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpositively	 ﾠ
related	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠengages	 ﾠin	 ﾠCSR.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAdditionally,	 ﾠCSR	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠused	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
strategy	 ﾠto	 ﾠboost	 ﾠemployee	 ﾠmorale,	 ﾠcreating	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠenergized	 ﾠworkforce	 ﾠthat	 ﾠleads	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠprofitability	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirm.	 ﾠ	 ﾠPorter	 ﾠand	 ﾠKramer	 ﾠ(2002)	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐known	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
3	 ﾠCSR is a general term that covers everything from firm-based community volunteering initiatives to 
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recent	 ﾠpiece	 ﾠadvocating	 ﾠthis	 ﾠview	 ﾠand	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠexamples	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
interdependence	 ﾠof	 ﾠCSR	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirm’s	 ﾠown	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠobjectives.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAs	 ﾠone	 ﾠexample:	 ﾠ
“Apple	 ﾠComputer	 ﾠhas	 ﾠlong	 ﾠdonated	 ﾠcomputers	 ﾠto	 ﾠschools	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠof	 ﾠintroducing	 ﾠ
its	 ﾠproducts	 ﾠto	 ﾠyoung	 ﾠpeople.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠa	 ﾠclear	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠschools	 ﾠ
while	 ﾠexpanding	 ﾠApple’s	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠand	 ﾠturning	 ﾠstudents	 ﾠand	 ﾠteachers	 ﾠinto	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠsophisticated	 ﾠpurchasers.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠEven	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcynically,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠnote	 ﾠthat	 ﾠPhilip	 ﾠMorris	 ﾠ
spent	 ﾠ$100	 ﾠmillion	 ﾠpublicizing	 ﾠa	 ﾠcharitable	 ﾠgift	 ﾠof	 ﾠ$75	 ﾠmillion.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠsummary,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
alternative	 ﾠview	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠwill	 ﾠuse	 ﾠcharitable	 ﾠdonations	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrategic	 ﾠmanner	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
increase	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠprofits.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
There	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhave	 ﾠstatistically	 ﾠexamined	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
observable	 ﾠfactors	 ﾠthat	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠa	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠengages	 ﾠin	 ﾠCSR	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠCSR	 ﾠactivity.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThese	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠinvariably	 ﾠexamine	 ﾠdata	 ﾠon	 ﾠnational-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠCSR	 ﾠ
activities	 ﾠby	 ﾠfirms.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThese	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠhave	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠfound	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthat	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠ(even	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
per-ﾭ‐employee	 ﾠbasis)	 ﾠtypically	 ﾠgoes	 ﾠup	 ﾠwith	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠsize	 ﾠ(e.g.,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠBrammer	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Millington,	 ﾠ2006,	 ﾠand	 ﾠMuller	 ﾠand	 ﾠWhiteman,	 ﾠ2009),	 ﾠthough	 ﾠAmato	 ﾠand	 ﾠAmato	 ﾠ
(2007)	 ﾠfind	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmainly	 ﾠholds	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠand	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠfirms,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
medium-ﾭ‐sized	 ﾠfirms.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠStudies	 ﾠhave	 ﾠhypothesized	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠgive	 ﾠmore	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠprofits	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠcash	 ﾠflow	 ﾠare	 ﾠhigh,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠhave	 ﾠnot	 ﾠfound	 ﾠconclusive	 ﾠstatistical	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
hypothesis	 ﾠ(e.g.,	 ﾠsee Seifert et al., 2003).	 ﾠ	 ﾠSome	 ﾠhave	 ﾠalso	 ﾠfound	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcharacteristics	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠindustry	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠa	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠoperates	 ﾠmatters.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠZhang	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ(2010)	 ﾠfind	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠin	 ﾠindustries	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠadvertising	 ﾠis	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠwere	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
donate	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ2008	 ﾠSichuan	 ﾠearthquake	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠin	 ﾠChina,	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠin	 ﾠindustries	 ﾠ
where	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠwas	 ﾠvery	 ﾠcompetitive	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcustomers.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠCSR	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ	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motivated	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠshare	 ﾠand	 ﾠprofits	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirm.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
4.2.	 ﾠGiving	 ﾠto	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠWay	 ﾠorganizations	 ﾠ
Unlike	 ﾠthese	 ﾠprior	 ﾠstudies,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠa	 ﾠstatistical	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠof	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠ(not	 ﾠ
national)	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠgiving.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠon	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠto	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠUW	 ﾠ
organizations	 ﾠand	 ﾠhave	 ﾠcollected	 ﾠa	 ﾠsample	 ﾠof	 ﾠestablishment-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠobservations	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
three	 ﾠUW	 ﾠorganizations	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWest	 ﾠcoast.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOur	 ﾠpresumption	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠgifts	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠUW	 ﾠorganization	 ﾠare	 ﾠa	 ﾠgood	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠof	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠCSR	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠfirm,	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
UW	 ﾠorganizations	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠU.S.	 ﾠare	 ﾠoften	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠagency	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠarea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
coordinates	 ﾠfundraising	 ﾠand	 ﾠvolunteer	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠfor	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠservices.	 ﾠ	 ﾠUW	 ﾠ
organizations	 ﾠwork	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠleaders,	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠagencies,	 ﾠschools,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
local	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐profit	 ﾠorganizations	 ﾠto	 ﾠidentify	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠneeds,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthen	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠfunding	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠagencies	 ﾠand	 ﾠcharitable	 ﾠorganizations	 ﾠto	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠthese	 ﾠneeds.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
There	 ﾠare	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠover	 ﾠone	 ﾠthousand	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠUW	 ﾠchapters	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠU.S.	 ﾠand	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
well-ﾭ‐recognized	 ﾠand	 ﾠpublicized	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠfundraising	 ﾠcampaigns	 ﾠeach	 ﾠyear.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠUW	 ﾠcontributions	 ﾠcomes	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠ
donations.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠBy	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠdonations,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠrefer	 ﾠto	 ﾠdonations	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
corporations	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠprofits,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontributions	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠemployees.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
2009	 ﾠAnnual	 ﾠReport	 ﾠof	 ﾠUW	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠexamples	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠgave	 ﾠ
millions	 ﾠof	 ﾠdollars	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠfor	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠUW	 ﾠprograms,	 ﾠand	 ﾠmany	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠalso	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠ
direct	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠgifts	 ﾠby	 ﾠmatching	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠemployees’	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠto	 ﾠUW.4	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠUW	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Greater	 ﾠKnoxville	 ﾠwebpage	 ﾠreports	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ30%	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠdonations	 ﾠcome	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
4	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 ﾠpage	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corporate	 ﾠgifts,	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠunreasonable	 ﾠto	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠrepresentative	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
other	 ﾠUW	 ﾠorganizations.5	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
4.3.	 ﾠHypotheses	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠof	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠownership	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Our	 ﾠmain	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextent	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠforeign-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠmay	 ﾠdiffer	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
domestic-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠUW	 ﾠ
organization,	 ﾠeverything	 ﾠelse	 ﾠequal.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOur	 ﾠnull	 ﾠhypothesis	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠforeign-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠ
do	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdiffer	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠway,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠwill	 ﾠmake	 ﾠCSR	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrict	 ﾠprofit-ﾭ‐maximization	 ﾠperspective,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠownership	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
influence	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprofit-ﾭ‐maximization	 ﾠenvironment	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠfirm.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠboth	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
assumptions	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠviolated	 ﾠand	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠhypotheses.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
An	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠhypothesis	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠare	 ﾠless	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠgive	 ﾠand/or	 ﾠ
give	 ﾠless	 ﾠthan	 ﾠdomestic-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠfirms.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThere	 ﾠare	 ﾠa	 ﾠcouple	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
true.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFirst,	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠportion	 ﾠof	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠforeign-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠfirms’	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠmay	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐local	 ﾠand,	 ﾠthus,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠprefers	 ﾠto	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠCSR	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐local	 ﾠ
consumers.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠstems	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠprofit-ﾭ‐maximizing	 ﾠmotive	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠcharitable	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
part	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠfirm’s	 ﾠmarketing	 ﾠefforts,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠownership	 ﾠis	 ﾠsystematically	 ﾠcorrelated	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirms’	 ﾠproducts.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
alternative	 ﾠhypothesis	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠforeign-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠoften	 ﾠhave	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠmanagers,	 ﾠ
who	 ﾠmay	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠCSR	 ﾠback	 ﾠto	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠhome	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
personal	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠbiased	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠhome	 ﾠcountry.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠviews	 ﾠ
corporate	 ﾠCSR	 ﾠas	 ﾠmotivated	 ﾠmore	 ﾠby	 ﾠmanagers’	 ﾠutility	 ﾠmaximization	 ﾠthan	 ﾠprofit-ﾭ‐
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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maximization	 ﾠconsiderations.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠjustifications	 ﾠare	 ﾠquite	 ﾠdifferent,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
both	 ﾠstem	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ“foreignness”	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠforeign-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠfirm,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠother	 ﾠattributes	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠconnected	 ﾠwith	 ﾠits	 ﾠMNE	 ﾠstatus.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠ
statistically,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠafter	 ﾠcontrolling	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsize	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠattributes.	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠhypothesis	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠare	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠgive	 ﾠ
and/or	 ﾠgive	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠdomestic-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠfirms.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOne	 ﾠreason	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirms’	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠculture	 ﾠdiffers	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠdomestic-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠ
engaging	 ﾠin	 ﾠmore	 ﾠCSR.6	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠsecond,	 ﾠmore	 ﾠintriguing,	 ﾠreason	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠmay	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠmore	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠand	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠbarriers	 ﾠto	 ﾠovercome	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ
domestic	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠand	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠuse	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠphilanthropy	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠto	 ﾠmitigate	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
barriers.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠmotive	 ﾠis	 ﾠcompatible	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠprofit	 ﾠmaximization	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠCSR,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠ
philanthropy	 ﾠis	 ﾠused	 ﾠas	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠfirm’s	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠstrategy.7	 ﾠ	 ﾠGoyal	 ﾠ(2006)	 ﾠ
provides	 ﾠa	 ﾠgame	 ﾠtheoretic	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠMNEs	 ﾠmay	 ﾠuse	 ﾠCSR	 ﾠto	 ﾠsignal	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠaccommodating	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠhost	 ﾠregion	 ﾠand	 ﾠthereby	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠmore	 ﾠfavorable	 ﾠ
location	 ﾠincentive	 ﾠpackages.	 ﾠ	 ﾠImportantly,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠsupporting	 ﾠthis	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠ
hypothesis	 ﾠare	 ﾠagain	 ﾠconnected	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“foreignness”	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirm,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠ
attributes	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠto	 ﾠall	 ﾠMNEs,	 ﾠregardless	 ﾠof	 ﾠownership.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
4.4.	 ﾠEmpirical	 ﾠspecifications	 ﾠ
To	 ﾠexamine	 ﾠour	 ﾠhypotheses,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠemploy	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠspecification:	 ﾠ
! 
Donationijt =" + #Foreign Ownershipit + $Xijt +% j +&ijt,	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
6	 ﾠOf	 ﾠcourse,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmay	 ﾠdiffer	 ﾠwith	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠsystematically	 ﾠless	 ﾠinclined	 ﾠto	 ﾠengage	 ﾠin	 ﾠCSR	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
7	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠFindlay’s	 ﾠ(1978)	 ﾠseminal	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠof	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠand	 ﾠtechnology	 ﾠ
transfer	 ﾠassumes	 ﾠthat	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠpay	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠwages	 ﾠ“for	 ﾠpurposes	 ﾠof	 ﾠgood	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠrelations.”	 ﾠ(p.	 ﾠ9)	 ﾠ
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where	 ﾠDonationijt	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠmeasuring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠdonation	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
establishment	 ﾠi	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠWay	 ﾠchapter	 ﾠj	 ﾠin	 ﾠyear	 ﾠt,	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOwnershipijt	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
indicator	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠof	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠownership	 ﾠof	 ﾠestablishment	 ﾠi	 ﾠin	 ﾠyear	 ﾠt,	 ﾠXijt	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠmatrix	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
other	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠvariables,	 ﾠθj	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠindicator	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠWay	 ﾠ
chapters	 ﾠto	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠin	 ﾠhow	 ﾠwell	 ﾠeach	 ﾠchapter	 ﾠis	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠraise	 ﾠcharitable	 ﾠ
donations,	 ﾠand	 ﾠεijt	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠerror-ﾭ‐term	 ﾠassumed	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠmean	 ﾠof	 ﾠzero.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠparameters,	 ﾠ
α,	 ﾠβ,	 ﾠand	 ﾠγ	 ﾠare	 ﾠcoefficients	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠestimated.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ We	 ﾠexplore	 ﾠour	 ﾠhypotheses	 ﾠusing	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠdifferent,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠrelated,	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
corporate	 ﾠdonations	 ﾠto	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠcharities.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠis	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠan	 ﾠindicator	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
whether	 ﾠestablishment	 ﾠi	 ﾠdonates	 ﾠany	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐zero	 ﾠamount	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠWay	 ﾠ
chapter	 ﾠj	 ﾠin	 ﾠyear	 ﾠt.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠallows	 ﾠus	 ﾠestimate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfactors	 ﾠaffecting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
local	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠusing	 ﾠProbit	 ﾠmaximum	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠestimation	 ﾠtechniques.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOur	 ﾠ
second	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠamount	 ﾠof	 ﾠdonation	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠby	 ﾠestablishment	 ﾠi	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠ
United	 ﾠWay	 ﾠchapter	 ﾠj	 ﾠin	 ﾠyear	 ﾠt.,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwe	 ﾠlog	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠskewness	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvariable.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠ
estimate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecification	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdependent	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠusing	 ﾠordinary-ﾭ‐least	 ﾠsquares	 ﾠ
estimation	 ﾠon	 ﾠonly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsample	 ﾠof	 ﾠestablishments	 ﾠthat	 ﾠgave	 ﾠa	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐zero	 ﾠamount.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Thus,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠestimates	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmagnitude	 ﾠof	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠ
donations	 ﾠconditional	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠdeciding	 ﾠto	 ﾠgive	 ﾠlocally.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ To	 ﾠavoid	 ﾠomitted	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠbias,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠvariables.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠ
note	 ﾠthat	 ﾠestimates	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠof	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠ
right	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfactors	 ﾠaffecting	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠquite	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ
what	 ﾠmotivates	 ﾠnational-ﾭ‐	 ﾠand	 ﾠinternational-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠgiving,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠonly	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprior	 ﾠliterature.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFirst,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠemployees	 ﾠof	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 17	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠestablishment	 ﾠ(Employeesit)	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠobservable	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠsize.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠprior	 ﾠ
studies	 ﾠfind	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠ(national	 ﾠand	 ﾠinternational)	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠphilanthropy	 ﾠgoes	 ﾠup	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠsize,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠexamining	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠphilanthropy	 ﾠ
patterns	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠestablishment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠprofitable	 ﾠfor	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠ
firms	 ﾠto	 ﾠengage	 ﾠin	 ﾠCSR	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠnational	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠthan	 ﾠto	 ﾠcoordinate	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠin	 ﾠall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
many	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠconsumers	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠlocated.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠmay	 ﾠ
actually	 ﾠgive	 ﾠless	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠlocation	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠserving	 ﾠnational,	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠlocal,	 ﾠmarkets.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
These	 ﾠconsiderations	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠa	 ﾠcouple	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠvariables.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Establishments	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠlocally-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠand	 ﾠsell	 ﾠprimarily	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠshould	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠgive	 ﾠlocally,	 ﾠeverything	 ﾠelse	 ﾠequal.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠwe	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhave	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠ
information	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠan	 ﾠestablishment	 ﾠis	 ﾠlocally-ﾭ‐owned,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsingle	 ﾠ
location	 ﾠestablishments	 ﾠ(Single	 ﾠPlantit)	 ﾠare	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠlocally-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠand,	 ﾠ
thus,	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠgive	 ﾠlocally	 ﾠthan	 ﾠa	 ﾠbranch	 ﾠplant	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmulti-ﾭ‐plant	 ﾠfirm.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠalso	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠa	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠindicating	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠa	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠestablishment	 ﾠis	 ﾠheadquarters	 ﾠ
(Headquartersit)	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠfirm.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠattribute	 ﾠimplies	 ﾠthe	 ﾠestablishment	 ﾠis	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
multi-ﾭ‐plant	 ﾠfirm,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠless	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠphilanthropy	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
discussion	 ﾠabove.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠa	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠgive	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠ
community	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠheadquartered.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠno	 ﾠclear	 ﾠprediction	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
sign	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcoefficient	 ﾠon	 ﾠthis	 ﾠvariable.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠalso	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠa	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠStandard	 ﾠIndustrial	 ﾠ
Classification	 ﾠ(SIC)	 ﾠ1-ﾭ‐digit	 ﾠindustry	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmay	 ﾠalso	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠestablishment	 ﾠis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠsell	 ﾠto	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠor	 ﾠto	 ﾠnational	 ﾠand	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 18	 ﾠ
international	 ﾠmarkets.8	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠmanufacturing	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsend	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠgoods	 ﾠ
around	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠless	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠgive	 ﾠlocally	 ﾠthan	 ﾠhomeowners	 ﾠinsurance	 ﾠ
firms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrely	 ﾠon	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠagents	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠrelationships	 ﾠwith	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠconsumers.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Finally,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠa	 ﾠtime	 ﾠtrend,	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthere	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠa	 ﾠnational	 ﾠtrend	 ﾠof	 ﾠlower	 ﾠ
giving	 ﾠto	 ﾠUW	 ﾠchapters	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast	 ﾠdecade,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠinflation	 ﾠcontributes	 ﾠto	 ﾠseeing	 ﾠ
higher	 ﾠnominal	 ﾠdonation	 ﾠamounts.9	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
4.5.	 ﾠData	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠis	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠUW.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠ
corporations	 ﾠmay	 ﾠgive	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠorganizations,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠUW	 ﾠserves	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
“umbrella”	 ﾠagency	 ﾠto	 ﾠfund	 ﾠraise	 ﾠand	 ﾠdistribute	 ﾠfunds	 ﾠto	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠcharities.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
expect	 ﾠUW	 ﾠdonations	 ﾠto	 ﾠcapture	 ﾠa	 ﾠrepresentative	 ﾠpattern	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠto	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠ
charities	 ﾠand	 ﾠcommunity.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠwere	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠcollect	 ﾠrecords	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠbusiness	 ﾠenterprise	 ﾠ
donations	 ﾠto	 ﾠthree	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠWay	 ﾠorganizations	 ﾠlocated	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWest	 ﾠcoast	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
United	 ﾠStates,	 ﾠone	 ﾠcovering	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠmetropolitan	 ﾠarea	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠoutlying	 ﾠsuburbs,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
two	 ﾠcovering	 ﾠsmaller	 ﾠmetropolitan	 ﾠareas	 ﾠunder	 ﾠ500,000	 ﾠin	 ﾠpopulation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠrecords	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠyears	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ2000s	 ﾠand	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠnames,	 ﾠaddresses,	 ﾠ
corporate	 ﾠdonations,	 ﾠand	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠnumbers	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcircumstances.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAs	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠinterested	 ﾠin	 ﾠphilanthropy	 ﾠmotives	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmanager	 ﾠand	 ﾠowners	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirm,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
8	 ﾠWe	 ﾠget	 ﾠqualitatively	 ﾠidentical	 ﾠresults	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠwe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠ2-ﾭ‐digit	 ﾠSIC	 ﾠindicator	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠthough	 ﾠmany	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠare	 ﾠdropped	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠmulticollinearity	 ﾠissues.	 ﾠ	 ﾠUse	 ﾠof	 ﾠindustry	 ﾠindicator	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠat	 ﾠeven	 ﾠfiner	 ﾠ
levels	 ﾠof	 ﾠdisaggregation	 ﾠintroduce	 ﾠsevere	 ﾠmulticollinearity	 ﾠissues	 ﾠand	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠconvergence	 ﾠissues	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
our	 ﾠprobit	 ﾠestimates.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
9	 ﾠWe	 ﾠget	 ﾠqualitatively	 ﾠidentical	 ﾠresults	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠusing	 ﾠyear	 ﾠindicator	 ﾠvariables.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 19	 ﾠ
corporate	 ﾠdonation	 ﾠamount	 ﾠexcludes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠfirm’s	 ﾠemployees.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠhad	 ﾠmultiple	 ﾠplants	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠarea,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcombined	 ﾠthese	 ﾠinto	 ﾠone	 ﾠobservation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠuse	 ﾠDun	 ﾠand	 ﾠBradstreet	 ﾠ(DB)	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠdirectories	 ﾠto	 ﾠsupplement	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
information	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUW	 ﾠorganizations.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFirst,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠgather	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠdata	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠthe	 ﾠenterprises	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠsample	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDB	 ﾠdirectories	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠmissing	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
original	 ﾠUW	 ﾠdata.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSecond,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDB	 ﾠdirectories	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
enterprise	 ﾠis	 ﾠdomestic-ﾭ‐	 ﾠor	 ﾠforeign-ﾭ‐owned,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠsingle-ﾭ‐enterprise	 ﾠ
firm	 ﾠor	 ﾠan	 ﾠaffiliate	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmulti-ﾭ‐location	 ﾠfirm.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠalso	 ﾠcan	 ﾠdistinguish	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDB	 ﾠdata	 ﾠ
whether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠenterprise	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠheadquarters	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠmulti-ﾭ‐location	 ﾠfirm.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThird,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDB	 ﾠ
directories	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠ4-ﾭ‐digit	 ﾠStandard	 ﾠIndustrial	 ﾠClassification	 ﾠ(SIC)	 ﾠcode	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
each	 ﾠenterprise.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠFourth,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDB	 ﾠdirectories	 ﾠto	 ﾠrandomly	 ﾠsample	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
enterprises	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠarea	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠenterprises	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠUW	 ﾠdata	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠget	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
control	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠenterprises	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠgive	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠUW.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFinally,	 ﾠour	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠis	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
whether	 ﾠforeign-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠdiffer	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠdonation	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ
domestic-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠfirms.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠwere	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠobtain	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnationality	 ﾠof	 ﾠownership	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
various	 ﾠplants	 ﾠusing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠonline	 ﾠdirectory	 ﾠservice	 ﾠof	 ﾠUniworld	 ﾠOnline	 ﾠ
(uniworldbp.com).	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠverified	 ﾠthese	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠwebpages.10	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠend	 ﾠup	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ7990	 ﾠusable	 ﾠobservations,	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ2890	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ36%)	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ7990	 ﾠenterprises	 ﾠgave	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUW	 ﾠorganizations	 ﾠwe	 ﾠsample.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcollect	 ﾠ
data	 ﾠon	 ﾠall	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐giving	 ﾠenterprises,	 ﾠonly	 ﾠa	 ﾠrandom	 ﾠsample	 ﾠof	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐givers,	 ﾠthus	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠ
percentage	 ﾠof	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠenterprises	 ﾠis	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠlower.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ7990	 ﾠenterprise-ﾭ‐year	 ﾠ
observations	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠsample,	 ﾠ282	 ﾠare	 ﾠconnected	 ﾠwith	 ﾠforeign-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠenterprises,	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
10	 ﾠThere	 ﾠwere	 ﾠ8	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUniworld	 ﾠOnline	 ﾠdatabase	 ﾠindicated	 ﾠwere	 ﾠforeign-ﾭ‐owned,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
we	 ﾠcould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠverify	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠother	 ﾠsources.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexcluded	 ﾠthese	 ﾠobservations.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 20	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠ31	 ﾠobservations	 ﾠhave	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐zero	 ﾠdonations	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠUW.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOf	 ﾠcourse,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
lower	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠrate	 ﾠby	 ﾠforeign-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠother	 ﾠreasons,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
industry	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthey	 ﾠbelong.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOur	 ﾠregression	 ﾠanalyses	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
what	 ﾠextent	 ﾠthese	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠfactors	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠby	 ﾠforeign-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠfirms.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
4.6.	 ﾠResults	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmentioned	 ﾠearlier,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexamine	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠdependent	 ﾠvariables.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
first	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“giving	 ﾠprobability”	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠgives	 ﾠany	 ﾠnonzero	 ﾠ
corporate	 ﾠgift	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠUW.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“giving	 ﾠlevel”	 ﾠ–	 ﾠhow	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠ
gives	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUW.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠexamine	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdonation	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠonly	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsample	 ﾠof	 ﾠenterprises	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠgive	 ﾠsome	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐zero	 ﾠamount.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠnext	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠresults	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeach	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠanalyses	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠturn,	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠexploring	 ﾠa	 ﾠfew	 ﾠextensions.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
4.6.1.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠdetermines	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠof	 ﾠgiving?	 ﾠ
Our	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠexamines	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfactors	 ﾠthat	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
enterprise	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠUW.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠProbit	 ﾠmaximum	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠtechniques	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
estimate	 ﾠcoefficients,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠreport	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarginal	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠof	 ﾠeach	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠto	 ﾠeasily	 ﾠinterpret	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmagnitude	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠestimated	 ﾠeffects.	 ﾠ
Thus,	 ﾠeach	 ﾠmarginal	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠindicates	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpercentage	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠchange	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠ
giving	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠdecimal	 ﾠform)	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠone-ﾭ‐unit	 ﾠchange	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠvariable.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
compared	 ﾠto	 ﾠour	 ﾠsample	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠof	 ﾠabout	 ﾠa	 ﾠ36%	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠestablishment	 ﾠ
donating	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠUW.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 21	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠresults	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠstatistical	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠon	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠprobabilities	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠin	 ﾠTable	 ﾠ1.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠcolumn,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠresults	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecification	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠthe	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOwnershipijt	 ﾠvariable.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsign	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠis	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠ
negative	 ﾠand	 ﾠstatistically	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1%	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmagnitude	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠlarge,	 ﾠ
indicating	 ﾠthat	 ﾠforeign-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠestablishments	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
29	 ﾠpercentage	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠless	 ﾠthan	 ﾠdomestic-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠestablishments.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnext	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠcolumns	 ﾠof	 ﾠTable	 ﾠ1,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠsequentially	 ﾠadd	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠvariables.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Column	 ﾠ2	 ﾠadds	 ﾠour	 ﾠvector	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠand	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠUW	 ﾠorganization	 ﾠindicator	 ﾠ
variables,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠcolumn	 ﾠ3	 ﾠadds	 ﾠthese	 ﾠplus	 ﾠa	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠ1-ﾭ‐digit	 ﾠSIC	 ﾠindustry	 ﾠindicator	 ﾠ
variables.	 ﾠ	 ﾠInclusion	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontrols	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfit	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠ
specification,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpseudo-ﾭ‐R2	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠrising	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ0.02	 ﾠto	 ﾠ0.18.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmagnitude	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠof	 ﾠforeign-ﾭ‐ownership	 ﾠfalls	 ﾠin	 ﾠhalf,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠis	 ﾠstill	 ﾠhighly	 ﾠstatistically	 ﾠ
significant	 ﾠand	 ﾠindicates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠforeign-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠestablishment	 ﾠis	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ16	 ﾠpercentage	 ﾠ
points	 ﾠless	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠengage	 ﾠin	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠWay	 ﾠchapter	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠdomestic-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠenterprise	 ﾠeven	 ﾠafter	 ﾠcontrolling	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsize,	 ﾠindustry,	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
attributes.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Many	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarginal	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠare	 ﾠstatistically	 ﾠ
significant	 ﾠand	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠresults	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠnew	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCSR	 ﾠliterature.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFirst,	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠsize	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
actually	 ﾠnegatively	 ﾠcorrelated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠgiving,	 ﾠin	 ﾠcontrast	 ﾠto	 ﾠprior	 ﾠresults	 ﾠ
showing	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠCSR	 ﾠis	 ﾠpositively	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsize.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOur	 ﾠestimates	 ﾠindicate	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠeach	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠ100	 ﾠemployees	 ﾠdecreases	 ﾠan	 ﾠestablishment’s	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
local	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠby	 ﾠ2.2	 ﾠpercentage	 ﾠpoints.	 ﾠ	 ﾠRelatedly,	 ﾠsingle-ﾭ‐plant	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠ(which	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠlocally	 ﾠowned	 ﾠand	 ﾠfocused)	 ﾠhave	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠprobabilities	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠ13.4	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 22	 ﾠ
percentage	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠthan	 ﾠother	 ﾠestablishments.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠfinally,	 ﾠestablishments	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠare	 ﾠheadquarters	 ﾠactually	 ﾠhave	 ﾠlower	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠprobabilities,	 ﾠby	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ4.7	 ﾠ
percentage	 ﾠpoints.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
4.6.2.	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠdetermines	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠamounts	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthose	 ﾠenterprises	 ﾠthat	 ﾠgive?	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠnow	 ﾠturn	 ﾠour	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠto	 ﾠexamining	 ﾠhow	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠfactors	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠthe	 ﾠamount	 ﾠ
given	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠenterprises	 ﾠthat	 ﾠchoose	 ﾠto	 ﾠgive	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUW.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠannual	 ﾠ
donation	 ﾠamount	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠdonating	 ﾠenterprise	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠsample	 ﾠis	 ﾠ$1,224.57,	 ﾠand	 ﾠranges	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠ$5	 ﾠto	 ﾠ$90,000.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠregressor	 ﾠset	 ﾠas	 ﾠfor	 ﾠour	 ﾠregressions	 ﾠexamining	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠof	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠgiving,	 ﾠthough	 ﾠwe	 ﾠlog	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdonation	 ﾠamount	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
employee	 ﾠsize	 ﾠvariable.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Table	 ﾠ2	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠresults	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthese	 ﾠstatistical	 ﾠanalyses,	 ﾠdisplaying	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠ
sequential	 ﾠinclusion	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontrols	 ﾠas	 ﾠin	 ﾠTable	 ﾠ1.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠcolumn	 ﾠshows	 ﾠthat	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠ
ownership	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠstatistically	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠdonation	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsample	 ﾠof	 ﾠestablishments	 ﾠthat	 ﾠgive	 ﾠto	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠWay	 ﾠchapter,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
coefficient	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠforeign-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠestablishments	 ﾠ106%	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ
domestic-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠestablishments.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAfter	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠa	 ﾠfull	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontrols	 ﾠ(column	 ﾠ3	 ﾠ
estimates)	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠgoes	 ﾠdown	 ﾠto	 ﾠabout	 ﾠa	 ﾠ38%	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠin	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠlevels,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠstatistically	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠand	 ﾠobviously	 ﾠeconomically	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠPutting	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠtogether	 ﾠwith	 ﾠearlier	 ﾠresults,	 ﾠforeign-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠare	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠless	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠengage	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠphilanthropy,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdo,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠat	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠquite	 ﾠhigh.	 ﾠOne	 ﾠ
reason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthat	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠonly	 ﾠgive	 ﾠlocally	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
obvious	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠand	 ﾠthey	 ﾠthen	 ﾠface	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠhurdles	 ﾠand	 ﾠbias.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 23	 ﾠ
suggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinteractions	 ﾠwith	 ﾠforeign-ﾭ‐ownership	 ﾠand	 ﾠestablishment	 ﾠ
size,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwill	 ﾠexplore	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnext	 ﾠsubsection.	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠresult	 ﾠobtains	 ﾠfor	 ﾠestablishment	 ﾠemployee	 ﾠsize.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠless	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠgive,	 ﾠour	 ﾠresults	 ﾠin	 ﾠTable	 ﾠ2	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
those	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠgive	 ﾠare	 ﾠpositively	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠestablishment’s	 ﾠsize	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠa	 ﾠ10%	 ﾠ
increase	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠestablishment’s	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠemployees	 ﾠis	 ﾠassociate	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠ2.7%	 ﾠ
increase	 ﾠin	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠdonation	 ﾠlevels.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcoefficient	 ﾠon	 ﾠsingle-ﾭ‐plant	 ﾠ
establishments	 ﾠand	 ﾠheadquarters	 ﾠare	 ﾠlikewise	 ﾠof	 ﾠopposite	 ﾠsign.	 ﾠ	 ﾠPutting	 ﾠthese	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠ
together	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠestimates	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprior	 ﾠsections,	 ﾠour	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠresults	 ﾠare	 ﾠthat	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠ
multi-ﾭ‐plant	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠare	 ﾠless	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠgive	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠUW,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdo	 ﾠgive,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
significantly	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠsmaller,	 ﾠsingle-ﾭ‐plant	 ﾠfirms.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThese	 ﾠresults	 ﾠare	 ﾠintriguing,	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠvery	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠof	 ﾠlarge,	 ﾠmulti-ﾭ‐plant	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠcomes	 ﾠto	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠgiving.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠOne	 ﾠtype	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠgive	 ﾠto	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠUW	 ﾠorganizations	 ﾠat	 ﾠall,	 ﾠ
perhaps	 ﾠchoosing	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠto	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠCSR	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnational	 ﾠor	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠother	 ﾠtype	 ﾠgives	 ﾠquite	 ﾠgenerously	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThese	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠremain	 ﾠ
even	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtype	 ﾠof	 ﾠindustry	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠis	 ﾠconnected	 ﾠwith.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
analysis	 ﾠhere	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠuncover	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠof	 ﾠlarge,	 ﾠmulti-ﾭ‐plant	 ﾠ
firms,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠshould	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠexamination	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠquestion.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
4.6.3.	 ﾠForeign-ﾭ‐ownership	 ﾠinteractions	 ﾠwith	 ﾠestablishment	 ﾠsize	 ﾠ
Larger	 ﾠestablishments	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠattention	 ﾠand	 ﾠscrutiny	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠcommunities.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠmedia	 ﾠreport	 ﾠany	 ﾠ
significant	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠin	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠat	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠemployers	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcommunities.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 24	 ﾠ
extra	 ﾠscrutiny	 ﾠmay	 ﾠaccentuate	 ﾠany	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠbias	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠforeign-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠfirms,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
increased	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠphilanthropy	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠto	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
relations	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠone	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠmitigating	 ﾠthese	 ﾠeffects.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
probability	 ﾠof	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠlocally	 ﾠand/or	 ﾠthe	 ﾠamount	 ﾠdonated	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠWay	 ﾠ
chapter	 ﾠmay	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsize	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠforeign-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠincreases.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠexamine	 ﾠ
this,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠadd	 ﾠto	 ﾠour	 ﾠspecifications	 ﾠa	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠthat	 ﾠinteracts	 ﾠour	 ﾠindicator	 ﾠfor	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠ
ownership	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠestablishment’s	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠemployees.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOur	 ﾠexpectations	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcoefficient	 ﾠon	 ﾠthis	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpositive.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Columns	 ﾠ1	 ﾠand	 ﾠ2	 ﾠof	 ﾠTable	 ﾠ3	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠthese	 ﾠresults.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcoefficient	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
interaction	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠis	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠand	 ﾠstatistically	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠfor	 ﾠboth	 ﾠour	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠ
specifications.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠof	 ﾠgiving,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresults	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
each	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠ100	 ﾠemployees	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠthe	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠestablishment’s	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
local	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠby	 ﾠ2.1	 ﾠpercentage	 ﾠpoints.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠtrivial	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
magnitude,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠeffect,	 ﾠas	 ﾠone	 ﾠwould	 ﾠneed	 ﾠan	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠof	 ﾠover	 ﾠ800	 ﾠ
employees	 ﾠto	 ﾠcounteract	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠof	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠownership	 ﾠ(an	 ﾠ18	 ﾠ
percentage	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠlower	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠof	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠthan	 ﾠa	 ﾠdomestic-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠ
establishment).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠof	 ﾠestablishment	 ﾠsize	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠforeign-ﾭ‐ownership	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠamount	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠis	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠlarger.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠone-ﾭ‐unit	 ﾠlog	 ﾠchange	 ﾠin	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠat	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
establishment	 ﾠessentially	 ﾠdoubles	 ﾠthe	 ﾠamount	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠforeign-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠ
establishments	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠexceeds	 ﾠdomestic-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠestablishments.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
While	 ﾠobviously	 ﾠfar	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠtest,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠresults	 ﾠare	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
hypothesis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠforeign-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠestablishments	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠscrutiny,	 ﾠ
leading	 ﾠthem	 ﾠto	 ﾠstrategically	 ﾠuse	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠphilanthropy	 ﾠto	 ﾠmitigate	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 25	 ﾠ
effects.	 ﾠ	 ﾠData	 ﾠcollection	 ﾠof	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠmedia	 ﾠstories	 ﾠon	 ﾠestablishments	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsample	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ
allow	 ﾠone	 ﾠto	 ﾠget	 ﾠa	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠof	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠscrutiny	 ﾠand	 ﾠexamine	 ﾠthis	 ﾠhypothesis	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠdirectly.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠarduous	 ﾠtask	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠleave	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠ
work.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
4.6.4.	 ﾠHeterogeneous	 ﾠforeign-ﾭ‐ownership	 ﾠinteractions	 ﾠby	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠsource	 ﾠ
One	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠissue	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexamine	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠheterogeneity	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠ
ownership	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠacross	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠMNE	 ﾠnationalities.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠPinkston	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Carrol	 ﾠ(1994)	 ﾠand	 ﾠBennett	 ﾠ(1998)	 ﾠsurvey	 ﾠMNEs	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠCSR	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
find	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠprocedures	 ﾠand	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠCSR	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠvary	 ﾠ
systematically	 ﾠaccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnationality	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMNE.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠvast	 ﾠmajority	 ﾠof	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠ
investors	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWest	 ﾠcoast	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates	 ﾠare	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠAsia,	 ﾠCanada,	 ﾠand	 ﾠEurope.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Therefore,	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠsample,	 ﾠ47%	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠforeign-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠestablishments	 ﾠhave	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠ
owners,	 ﾠ29%	 ﾠare	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠAsian	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠ(primarily	 ﾠJapan),	 ﾠand	 ﾠ17%	 ﾠare	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠCanada.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠcolumns	 ﾠ3	 ﾠand	 ﾠ4	 ﾠof	 ﾠTable	 ﾠ3,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠindicator	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠ
specifications	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠan	 ﾠestablishment	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠforeign-ﾭ‐owned,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
Asian	 ﾠor	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠownership.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠexcluded	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠis	 ﾠthus	 ﾠprimarily	 ﾠCanadian-ﾭ‐
owned	 ﾠestablishments.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAs	 ﾠresults	 ﾠin	 ﾠcolumn	 ﾠ3	 ﾠshow,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠno	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠacross	 ﾠ
nationality	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠforeign-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠwill	 ﾠengage	 ﾠin	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠ
corporate	 ﾠphilanthropy.	 ﾠ	 ﾠColumn	 ﾠ4	 ﾠresults,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠ
who	 ﾠdonate	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠWay	 ﾠchapters	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠgive	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠdomestic-ﾭ‐
owned	 ﾠfirms,	 ﾠunlike	 ﾠother	 ﾠforeign-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠfirms.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ Prior	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠof	 ﾠFDI	 ﾠand	 ﾠMNEs	 ﾠon	 ﾠhost	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠ
primarily	 ﾠfocused	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠfor	 ﾠgrowth,	 ﾠproductivity,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwages.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠ
first	 ﾠdiscusses	 ﾠnew	 ﾠpossibilities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠarea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcenter	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
interactions	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠand	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirms.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠAs	 ﾠan	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
analyze	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠand	 ﾠhow	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠphilanthropy	 ﾠby	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠto	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠcharities	 ﾠmay	 ﾠ
differ	 ﾠin	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠways	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfirms.	 ﾠ	 ﾠUsing	 ﾠdata	 ﾠon	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
local	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠWay	 ﾠchapters,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠfind	 ﾠthat	 ﾠforeign-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠenterprises	 ﾠare	 ﾠless	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
give,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdo	 ﾠgive,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠsubstantially	 ﾠmore	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠamount	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ
domestic	 ﾠfirms,	 ﾠeverything	 ﾠelse	 ﾠequal.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠis	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
hypothesis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠforeign-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠwould	 ﾠprefer	 ﾠto	 ﾠuse	 ﾠCSR	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
international	 ﾠscale,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwill	 ﾠstrategically	 ﾠuse	 ﾠCSR	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠmotives	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠMNE	 ﾠfaces	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠscrutiny	 ﾠand/or	 ﾠbias.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ We	 ﾠthink	 ﾠexamination	 ﾠof	 ﾠinteractions	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠand	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠ
communities	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠinteresting,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠimportant,	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠto	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠ
location	 ﾠof	 ﾠFDI,	 ﾠinfrastructure	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠof	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠcommunities,	 ﾠand	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
national	 ﾠpolitics.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOur	 ﾠpaper’s	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠand	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠhas	 ﾠmainly	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠcentered	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
issues	 ﾠfor	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠdeveloped	 ﾠeconomy,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstakes	 ﾠand	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
issues	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠeven	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠfor	 ﾠless-ﾭ‐developed	 ﾠareas	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld.	 ﾠ	 ﾠCalvano	 ﾠ(2008)	 ﾠ
provides	 ﾠexamples	 ﾠof	 ﾠconflicts	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠMNEs	 ﾠand	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠless-ﾭ‐
developed	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠand	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfactors	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcontribute	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠconflict.	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
United	 ﾠWay	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠ No	 ﾠ Yes	 ﾠ Yes	 ﾠ
Industry	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠ No	 ﾠ No	 ﾠ Yes	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ








Pseudo	 ﾠR2	 ﾠ 0.02	 ﾠ 0.16	 ﾠ 0.18	 ﾠ
Observations	 ﾠ 8115	 ﾠ 7990	 ﾠ 7990	 ﾠ
Notes:	 ﾠ	 ﾠTable	 ﾠreports	 ﾠmarginal	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠerrors	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠ
maximum	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠProbit	 ﾠspecification	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠdependent	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠindicating	 ﾠ
whether	 ﾠa	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠdonated	 ﾠto	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠWay	 ﾠchapter	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠyear.	 ﾠ	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠ
way	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠare	 ﾠa	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠbinary	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠto	 ﾠindicate	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠWay	 ﾠ
organizations,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠindustry	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠare	 ﾠbinary	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠto	 ﾠindicate	 ﾠ1-ﾭ‐digit	 ﾠSIC	 ﾠ
industry	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirm.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ**	 ﾠdenotes	 ﾠstatistical	 ﾠsignificance	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1%	 ﾠlevel,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠ*	 ﾠ
denotes	 ﾠstatistical	 ﾠsignificance	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ5%	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠ
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 ﾠemployee	 ﾠsize	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 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
United	 ﾠWay	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠ No	 ﾠ Yes	 ﾠ Yes	 ﾠ
Industry	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠ No	 ﾠ No	 ﾠ Yes	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	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 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ








Pseudo	 ﾠR2	 ﾠ 0.01	 ﾠ 0.50	 ﾠ 0.51	 ﾠ
Observations	 ﾠ 2902	 ﾠ 2738	 ﾠ 2738	 ﾠ
Notes:	 ﾠ	 ﾠTable	 ﾠreports	 ﾠcoefficients	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠerrors	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠ
ordinary	 ﾠleast	 ﾠsquares	 ﾠspecification	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsample	 ﾠof	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdonated	 ﾠto	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
local	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠWay	 ﾠchapter	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠyear.	 ﾠ	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠway	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠare	 ﾠa	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠbinary	 ﾠ
variables	 ﾠto	 ﾠindicate	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠWay	 ﾠorganizations,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠindustry	 ﾠ
effects	 ﾠare	 ﾠbinary	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠto	 ﾠindicate	 ﾠ1-ﾭ‐digit	 ﾠSIC	 ﾠindustry	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirm.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ**	 ﾠdenotes	 ﾠ
statistical	 ﾠsignificance	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1%	 ﾠlevel,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠ*	 ﾠdenotes	 ﾠstatistical	 ﾠsignificance	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ5%	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠ
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TABLE	 ﾠ3:	 ﾠFirm	 ﾠSize	 ﾠand	 ﾠCountry	 ﾠSource	 ﾠEffects	 ﾠ
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Likelihood	 ﾠRatio	 ﾠTest:	 ﾠChi-ﾭ‐









Pseudo	 ﾠR2	 ﾠ 0.18	 ﾠ 0.51	 ﾠ 0.18	 ﾠ 0.51	 ﾠ
Observations	 ﾠ 7990	 ﾠ 2738	 ﾠ 7990	 ﾠ 2738	 ﾠ
Notes:	 ﾠ	 ﾠColumns	 ﾠ1	 ﾠand	 ﾠ3	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresults	 ﾠreport	 ﾠmarginal	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠ
errors	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠmaximum	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠProbit	 ﾠspecification	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠdependent	 ﾠ
variable	 ﾠindicating	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠa	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠdonated	 ﾠto	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠWay	 ﾠchapter	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
given	 ﾠyear.	 ﾠColumns	 ﾠ2	 ﾠand	 ﾠ4	 ﾠreport	 ﾠcoefficients	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠerrors	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
standard	 ﾠordinary	 ﾠleast	 ﾠsquares	 ﾠspecification	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsample	 ﾠof	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
donated	 ﾠto	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠWay	 ﾠchapter	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠyear.	 ﾠ	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠway	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠbinary	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠto	 ﾠindicate	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠWay	 ﾠorganizations,	 ﾠ
while	 ﾠindustry	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠare	 ﾠbinary	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠto	 ﾠindicate	 ﾠ1-ﾭ‐digit	 ﾠSIC	 ﾠindustry	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
firm.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ**	 ﾠdenotes	 ﾠstatistical	 ﾠsignificance	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1%	 ﾠlevel,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠ*	 ﾠdenotes	 ﾠstatistical	 ﾠ
significance	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ5%	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠ
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